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We discuss a case study of the influence of epistemology on learning for a student in an
introductory college physics course. An analysis of videotaped class work, written work,
and interviews indicates that many of the student’s difficulties were epistemological in
nature. Our primary goal is to show instructors and curriculum developers that a student’s
epistemological stance – her ideas about knowledge and learning – can have a direct,
causal influence on her learning of physics. This influence exists even when research-
based curriculum materials provide implicit epistemological support. For this reason,
curriculum materials and teaching techniques could become more effective by explicitly
attending to students’ epistemologies.
I.  INTRODUCTION
In the past 15 years, physics education researchers
have identified student difficulties in learning a broad range
of physics concepts. Curricula targeting these difficulties
have produced dramatically improved conceptual
understanding.1 In recent years, the physics education
research community also has begun to look at student
attitudes, expectations, and epistemologies (ideas about
knowledge and learning).2,3,4 For instance, students may
think of physics knowledge as disconnected facts and
formulas, or as interconnected concepts (often expressible as
formulas). Students may think of learning physics as
absorbing information from authority or as building up their
own ideas.5 This discipline-specific epistemology research
builds on extensive research on more generalized
epistemology.6
The recent focus on epistemology in physics education
stems in part from two motivating ideas: (i) Students’
epistemologies may affect their science learning. In that
case, attending to epistemology may help us explain the
variations in student learning outcomes with research-based
curricula, create more effective curricula, and become better
physics instructors. (ii) Fostering productive attitudes and
epistemologies is in itself an important instructional
outcome that could serve the students well beyond the
course in question.
Our study addresses the first of these ideas and builds
on previous research on college and pre-college learners.
Most previous research has looked at correlations between
epistemological measures and learning outcomes, finding
that specific clusters of epistemological beliefs correlate
with academic outcomes such as grade point average7 and
mathematical text comprehension.8 In the physical sciences,
one study found that certain epistemological beliefs correlate
with integrated conceptual understanding in middle school,9
while another found a correlation with ninth-graders’ ability
to reason on applied tasks.10 In college physics, May and
Etkina found correlations between students’ gains on
standard conceptual measures and their epistemologies as
inferred from weekly written reflections on their own
learning.11
A few studies have gone beyond these correlations
to look at the causal influence of epistemology on students’
learning behavior. These studies, generally carried out by
observing students in the process of learning, have
attempted to describe not just whether, but how learning is
affected by epistemology and related factors. An excellent
example is Hogan’s thorough study on eighth-graders in
which she observed relationships between students’
“personal frameworks for science learning” and their social
and cognitive engagement patterns during group learning.12
Ryder and Leach’s study found some correlations between
college students’ ideas about the nature of scientific
knowledge and their self-reported activities during
investigative project work.13 Millar et al. observed that,
among 9 to 14-year-olds, students’ interpretations of
classroom inquiry tasks varied according to their perceptions
of the aims of scientific investigation.14 Taylor-Robertson
found differences in cognitive strategies used by college
students according to their expectations of the
meaningfulness of laboratory work,15 and Edmondson found
correlations between students’ reported learning strategies
and their epistemological stances as derived from
interviews.16 Dweck’s work with students of varied ages
showed some dramatic differences in learning behavior in
the classroom which depended on students’ ideas about the
nature of intelligence.17 And Hammer’s study on college
students described how students’ ideas about knowledge and
learning in physics affected how they solved physics
homework problems during think-aloud interviews.2 Taken
together, these studies suggest a causal link between
epistemology and learning and also raise new questions and
issues. One issue is the distinction between personal and
public epistemologies. Public epistemology encompasses a
student’s ideas about the nature of knowledge and learning
for society as a whole - or for a disciplinary community.
Personal epistemology concerns a student’s ideas about her
own knowledge and learning. A student’s public and
personal epistemologies can differ significantly. For
instance, a student may doubt the possibility of coherence
in her own knowledge (personal epistemology), but may
expect scientists to seek and find coherence (public
epistemology). Some of the previous correlation studies
have looked at only one of these aspects of epistemology,
while others have not made this distinction. Of the three
“personal frameworks for science learning” in Hogan’s
research, one aligns fairly closely with personal
epistemology while another aligns with public
epistemology. She found that personal epistemology was
linked strongly to the students’ behavior, while public
epistemology showed almost no effect. Thus her results
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point toward personal epistemology as being much more
relevant to learning. For that reason, we focus on the
personal epistemology of our student subject. This paper
builds more on the work of Hogan,12 Hammer,2 and May
and Etkina,11 which focused on personal epistemology, than
on the other studies mentioned above,3,4,7-10,13-16 which
looked at public epistemology or a combination of personal
and public epistemology and other attitude-related variables.
To build on this line of research, we have done an
in-depth and naturalistic case study of a single student to
distill and carefully describe the likely causal mechanisms.
Of course, a case study cannot produce definitive,
generalizable results about causality. But it can add depth
and detail to the perceptive toolkit of the instructor and
curriculum developer by exploring specific causal
mechanisms that might explain the correlations, and it can
generate specific hypotheses about causal mechanisms for
later testing in controlled-intervention studies. The
following hypothetical example illustrates this point.
Suppose a correlation is found between how quickly people
learn rock climbing skills and how many safe exposures to
heights they experienced as children. A possible causal
mechanism underlying this correlation might be that lack of
safe exposure to heights as children leads to a fear of
heights, which then leads to some learners making more
cautious movements. Case studies of a few slow-learning
novice rock climbers might shed light on this hypothesis.
As they first attempt new moves, do they give clues to their
fear of heights verbally or physiologically? Can we rule out
other possible causes by watching their behavior in detail? If
so, the next step toward establishing causal mechanism
might be a controlled-intervention study, safely exposing
children to heights, enrolling them in a rock climbing class
15 years later, and comparing their learning speed to a
control group who received a different intervention as
children (for example, reading about rock climbing). Our
goal is to develop a plausible existence argument and
descriptive analysis for one particular causal mechanism
between epistemology and learning, a mechanism that we
hope will be tested in future controlled-intervention
experiments.
The various previous studies we have cited also
vary in the extent to which they disentangled students’
personal epistemologies from their expectations about
what’s rewarded in a particular course. It can be difficult to
distinguish between what a student thinks is productive for
her learning and what she perceives is required by the
teacher or the curriculum. Yet these can be quite disparate at
times. Hammer’s work with one student illustrates an
example where a student ruefully and self-consciously
abandoned her productive learning strategies to survive in a
memorization-focused physics course.18 A 1999 study by
Elby gave some insight into the magnitude of the
epistemology/expectations gap.19
Yet another issue arising in previous studies is the
context-sensitivity of students’ epistemologies. Survey-
based research on students’ epistemologies has established
differences in approaches according to discipline, motivating
research that is discipline-specific (such as Ref. 3).
However, studies that involved observations of learning
behaviors and studies with multiple epistemological
assessments also uncovered a sensitivity of epistemology to
context within a given discipline. Hogan, for example,
found that epistemologies assessed in interviews differed
from the approaches students took in class. One might
expect this difference between students’ tacit ideas and their
explicitly articulated ones, but Hogan’s interview methods
included elicitation of tacit ideas through scenario-posing.12
Thus it has become clear that taking context-sensitivity into
account when designing studies and analyzing data is crucial
in understanding epistemology and learning.
In our study, we look at a student, “Jan” and study
both her personal epistemology and her learning and
describe how one affects the other. By analyzing both
epistemology and learning from the same set of classroom
data, we avoid many context-related interpretive challenges
and also provide a description that is immediately relevant
to classroom learning and instruction. We use a separate set
of data from interviews for a supplementary analysis,
carefully accounting for context-driven differences and
factors that point to public epistemology, expectations, and
other influences. From this analysis, we are able to describe
direct, causal links that are likely to exist between Jan’s
epistemology and her learning in the classroom. Due to the
difficulty of making and describing such an in-depth
argument about causality, we will do so for only one facet
of Jan’s epistemology, although Jan certainly possesses a
wide array of ideas about knowledge and learning. We will
focus only on how Jan selected and used conceptual
resources in her physics learning, and not on other facets of
her epistemology such as whether she treated knowledge as
static or evolving.
After discussing our methods in Sec. II, we present in
Sec. III two examples of Jan’s classroom behavior in group
work. In Sec. IV we use these examples to argue that a
component of Jan’s epistemology, her perception of a “wall”
between formal reasoning and everyday/intuitive reasoning,
contributes to her troubles learning the material. We then
use an independent data set from clinical interviews to argue
that Jan’s epistemology does include this “wall.” Section IV
also addresses alternative, non-epistemological explanations
of Jan’s classroom behavior. Although some of those factors
contribute to Jan’s actions, we argue that no combination of
them adequately accounts for her behavior, unless our
epistemological explanation is included. This strengthens
our case for a causal link between Jan’s epistemology and
her learning. In Sec. V we summarize this argument and
discuss implications for instruction and research.
II. METHODS
IIA. Selection of our case study subject and collection of
data
The subject of this case study, Jan, was a third-year
student in the second semester of an algebra-based
introductory physics course at the University of Maryland.
The course, taken by about 100 students and taught by a
physics education researcher, consisted of 3 hours per week
of interactive lectures (including interactive lecture
demonstrations20 and other physics education research
inspired elements), one hour of tutorial (worksheet-led
conceptual group work21), and two hours of traditional-style
laboratories. Jan had taken this course’s prerequisite in the
previous semester in a large lecture, purely traditional
format from a different professor. Although we will
highlight some of Jan’s difficulties, overall she was a
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capable student. She has excellent mathematical skills, did
well on the more traditional homework problems, and put
in considerable effort, seeking help from peers. Some
concepts she learned quite deeply while others she did not.
Jan was in one of the two groups of students we
videotaped working in tutorials and laboratories over the
course of the semester. For Jan’s group, we had two usable
hours of videotape. The other videotapes of her group were
unusable because they were inaudible or because the
discussion focused primarily on logistics rather than physics
concepts. From among the students in her group, we chose
to study Jan because she was neither a top nor a low-
performing student, and because we believed that we were
seeing epistemological indications in her behavior that we
could explore with further analysis. (Again, since we are
trying to make an existence argument and a descriptive
analysis for a certain mechanism, rather than a generalizable
conclusion, a random representative sample isn’t necessary.)
The following semester, she agreed to undergo six
interviews about student reasoning with one of us (AE),
whom she had not met previously. Over the following year
the interviews were audiotaped and transcribed. Jan received
$10 per interview. The first four interviews consisted
primarily of Jan reasoning aloud in response to physics
questions about real-world objects and phenomena. The
final two interviews consisted of more formal, quantitative
problems and of increasingly direct probes of Jan’s
epistemology.
IIB. Analysis of the data and interpretation of the
results
We reviewed the two usable hours of videotaped
classroom data and looked for instances in which
epistemology seemed to affect Jan’s approach to learning
and doing physics. From this review we developed a
hypothesis about Jan’s epistemology and its causal
relationship to her learning. To test this hypothesis, we
attempted to explain her classroom behavior in non-
epistemological terms, by focusing on expectations (her
perceptions of what is rewarded in the course), confidence,
skills and habits, and the social dynamics in her tutorial
group and in the interviews. We also used Jan’s written
homework to test predictions of the hypothesis we generated
from the classroom and interview data. To quantify patterns
in Jan’s reasoning during the interviews, we developed and
applied a coding scheme designed to pinpoint when she
used formal, classroom-taught reasoning versus “everyday”
and intuitive informal reasoning; when she was sense-
making versus just trying to remember or throwing out
ideas with little thought; and when she attempted to
reconcile different lines of reasoning. We describe this
scheme more fully in Sec. IV.
III. CLASSROOM DATA
IIIA. Episode 1:  The electric field tutorial
The earliest usable video segment shows the students
working for an hour on a tutorial developed at the
University of Maryland to address student difficulties with
the concept of the electric field. At this time in the
semester, the four students (Jan, Veronica, Carl, and Nancy)
have been working together for just a few weeks. Early in
the tutorial, students find the electric force, F, exerted by a
single, stationary source charge, Q, on several test charges,
q, of differing magnitudes placed at the same point. They
then work out the ratio of the force to the test charge, define
the field, E, as the ratio, and then continue to explore which
factors affect the field and which do not. The main point of
this part of tutorial is that E expresses the influence of the
source charge in a way that doesn’t depend on the test
charge used to “measure” that influence. The full transcript
appears in the Appendix22 of the electronically archived
version of this paper.
Jan participates quite a bit, as do Veronica and Nancy.
During the first part of the hour, Jan answers the tutorial
worksheet questions using mathematical reasoning.
Specifically, she reasons using the functional dependences
between force, charge, and field in the relations F = kQq/r2
and E = F/q. While doing so, she makes a series of errors
that her group members and the teaching assistants catch
and help her correct. After the students look at the forces,
the worksheet asks them to describe the dependence of the
electric field on the magnitude of the test charge. Veronica
figures out that the field is independent of the test charge
and Jan agrees with her. However, a few minutes later, Jan
claims she doesn’t get it, and explains her math reasoning.
Veronica helps her and Jan eventually seems to understand.
Veronica: It’s the same ratio, cause the higher the test
charge the bigger the force.
Jan: Right, so they’re proportional.
[Veronica and Nancy digress for a while and then
Veronica explains the ratio idea to Nancy.]
Jan: I don’t really get that, though. Cause like you
know how you were saying that E = F/q.  Cause like
they're saying that that's -
 Veronica: It’s force per test charge. So if you have a
big test charge it’s…
Jan: I thought that meant that the electric field i s
gonna get, if you have a small one, then the E-field i s
gonna be big. But then if you have, cause you know,
cause like my understanding is that it says like
describes the ratio of the force felt by the test charge
and the strength of the test charge, right?
Veronica: Yeah the q changes, but that makes the force
different.
Jan: So it’s not the E-field that changes but the force
that changes.
When asked to consider the E-field at a different
distance, Jan claims it cannot change. This time Nancy
corrects Jan’s math error.
Jan: No, but what I am saying is E is equal to F over q,
right? That doesn’t include radius in it.
Nancy: But F includes, um, includes r. Jan: Because
further away is smaller.
When asked to consider how the field changes when
the source charge changes, again Jan returns to E = F/q, this
time reasoning as if q represented the source charge rather
than the test charge. Nancy tries to make a non-
mathematical argument, but Jan ignores her.
Jan: If q is on the bottom.
Nancy: The point charge becoming smaller is the same
thing as the distance becoming greater. It affects the
outcome of this yet, so it’s the same thing.
Jan: If this [q] becomes smaller then that [F] becomes
bigger. That’s all it is, right?
Later, when the TA asserts that the field doesn’t
depend on the test charge, Jan protests that it does and
Veronica agrees with Jan, using the erroneous math
reasoning that Jan has been persistently using (reasoning
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with the formula E = F/q while ignoring the functional
dependence of F on q), and Jan verifies that this is what she
is thinking.   Veronica immediately catches her own error,
but Jan does not comment, continuing to appear confused.
It is important to notice that Jan is using mathematical
reasoning that is sophisticated for this population.
Confronted with an equation, she does not try to plug and
chug. Instead, she tries to extract information from the
functional dependencies of different quantities; she’s good at
attending to proportionalities and inverse proportionalities.
However, despite her facility with mathematics, she makes
several math errors. Although she is corrected each time and
acknowledges her mistake, four times in a row, Jan makes
the same math error, repeatedly reasoning with the equation
E = F/q without considering the fact that the force F
depends on distance and on the test charge, the very
quantities she is being asked to vary.
Jans problem here seems to be her failure to check her
mathematical reasoning against her common sense
reasoning. Specifically, she does not link her math to a
sense of physical mechanism in the way that Veronica does.
For instance, it is highly unlikely that Jan would find
sensible her prediction that the field does not change as the
distance changes, were she to think it through intuitively. It
is unlikely that she would continue to ignore the functional
dependencies of F  in the relation E = F/q were she
attending to more than just mathematical accuracy each time
a group member corrects her. In the interviews, Jan
considers it obvious that greater distance leads to weaker
fields. She momentarily acknowledges her understanding of
this common sense idea in class by emphasizing “Because
further away is smaller” in response to Nancy’s comment.
But then she ignores this idea, returning to reasoning with
E = F/q in isolation, as if the common sense ideas were
irrelevant. Jan seems almost not to even hear the next
attempt by Nancy to make a common sense argument, and
then says about the mathematical reasoning, “That’s all it
is, right?”
We think this behavior is both a window into Jan’s
epistemology and evidence of how it is affecting her
learning. In the following discussion, we propose that Jan’s
epistemology is causing her to act as if a “wall” separates
formal reasoning from informal, common-sense reasoning
and that this wall accounts for her lack of checking her
mathematical answers against her informal understanding.
IIB. The light and shadow tutorial
Eight weeks later, the same four students are working
on the Light and Shadow Tutorial .21  The group has several
light bulbs, a board with several small apertures, and a large
screen. They manipulate the bulbs and apertures and observe
the changes in the pattern of light on the screen. As the
students work through the activities, the worksheet guides
them to build a model of light to explain their observations.
Early in the hour, the students observe that moving the bulb
to the right causes the bright spot on the screen to move to
the left, the opposite direction.
While attempting to answer the worksheet question,
“What do your observations suggest about the path taken by
light from the bulb to the screen?,” Jan initiates a
discussion of physical mechanism.
Jan: So does that mean that the path is not a straight
line? . . . Does that mean it’s reflecting?
Nancy: Oh, that’s a good point. I don’t know.
Veronica: No, there’s no mirror for it to reflect off.
Jan: But it’s not direct, right? Cause if it were direct,
then wouldn’t it move up when we move the thing up?
Veronica: No. Because it’s going like this. When you
move it up. It’s going through a hole. Well, I mean, I
guess it is reflected light. Cause look, here’s the hole.
It’s down here. It’s going to go through the hole like
that. You know what I mean? Because it’s its position
relative to that hole.
Jan: But I mean, if it, if if it was direct, right, then the
light wouldn’t come through if it wasn’t aligned.
Veronica: If it was direct, then it would go like this.
[gesturing horizontally with hand from light bulb,
bangs into board above aperture to show that light
would not pass through]
Jan: Right. That’s what I mean.
Veronica: It would hit, it would just hit the board.
Well, the light goes out, like that, like that. So, it’s
going to go, whatever path of that light it’s going to
hit right through the circle, it’s going to keep going
straight that way.
Jan: Right.
Veronica seems confused about the “reflecting” and
“direct” issues, but may realize that she and Jan might mean
something different by “direct.”  So Veronica then goes on
to explain in everyday language what she thinks is
happening. Jan indicates that she understands. The dialogue
continues with Veronica helping the group to understand
how the model explains their observations.
Nancy: How is it possible for the things to, like when
we have the two bulbs, for one little circle to create the
two . . .
Veronica: Because they are two different directions.
One’s going in like that and one is going in like that.
Jan: So you are saying that . . .
Nancy: But what’s the normal direction of the light?
Cause that’s what I’m asking.
Veronica: It, it spans out, and whatever part goes
through that circle is the part we’re going to see.
Jan: [drawing as she talks] So the light is like that and
these are the rays, and the vector points that way will
go through the hole.
Nancy: Okay, so then if you move it up, then it’s
going to be?
Carl: So if here is the hole and the light is down here,
the light is going to go in the direction …
Jan: Right, so like it has
[Nancy, Jan, and Carl talking, unintelligible]
Veronica: Really, it’s just normal.
Jan: All the rays are going like this. So, it’s kind of
like polarized.
Veronica: Mmm, not really.
Jan’s behavior here is puzzling. She is engaged and
indicates her understanding of others’ explanations, but she
is using more technical and mathematical language:  “rays,”
“vector,” and “polarized.”  Her use of this last term is
particularly striking. What is Jan doing in this exchange? Is
she, like the others, trying to make sense of her
observations and her group’s explanations, or is something
else going on? Veronica takes on this issue.
Veronica: It’s just, well, it’s just, guys you’re making
it, you’re trying to make it more difficult. It’s just, the
light goes out. It only goes through that one circle.
So, obviously, if it is down here, and I’m looking
through that circle. Look, you’re sitting down here.
You’re looking at this big cardboard. You’re looking
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through that little circle. All you’re going to see i s
what’s up there. It’s a direct line.
In accusing the group of “trying to make it more
difficult” than it really is, Veronica suggests that something
other than simple sense-making is going on. Why would
the group – and Jan in particular – do this? Fortunately, Jan
tells us what she is up to.
Jan: Look, I see what you’re saying, alright. But, I’m
just trying to make it like physics- physics-oriented.
[laughs]
Veronica: It is, it is physics-oriented. That’s just the
way it is.
Jan: Alright.
Jan’s behavior during this episode seems puzzling at
first, but Jan is quite explicit in describing her motives.
“I’m just trying to make it like, physics- physics-oriented.”
Her words and her behavior reveal her epistemology and its
impact on her choices. Although she desists when
challenged by Veronica, Jan strongly implies that she is not
looking for an informal, common-sense explanation.
We should notice that, in searching for the more
formal explanation and rejecting the common-sense one, Jan
still claims to understand what the group has been
discussing. (“I see what you’re saying.”) It may be that Jan
is considering the intuitive explanation but searching for
more technical language for the worksheet. Alternatively, it
may be that Jan’s rejection includes passing up an
opportunity to understand intuitively.  In isolation, her
behavior here cannot distinguish these two possibilities.
However, her homework sheds light on this issue by
revealing a lack of understanding on Jan’s part. The
assignment asks students to apply the model for light they
just constructed. When asked to predict the shape and size
of a shadow, Jan draws straight lines indicating the rays of
light from the bulb. However, her rays reach only the
blocking object and do not extend all the way to the screen.
She does not attempt to answer the question further and
when asked to explain her prediction writes, “I don’t know
how else to think about it except for the rays from the light
bulb.” This directly contradicts the understanding she
claims to have had during the discussion. If she really
understood what Veronica was saying, she would have
another way of thinking about it, the common-sense way
Veronica keeps describing. (“Look, you’re sitting down
here. You’re looking at this big cardboard … All you’re
going to see …”) Veronica, using this understanding, gives
complete and correct qualitative and quantitative responses
on the homework, whereas Jan’s formal labeling of the
phenomena has not given her enough real understanding for
either task.
When we combine this information from her
homework with the statements she makes, the
epistemological implications become clearer. As in the first
episode (with E  = F/q), Jan behaves as if common sense
reasoning is a separate endeavor from formal
(mathematical or technical) reasoning, and that she
considers only the latter to be “physics-oriented.”
IV. DISCUSSION
IVA. Preliminary hypothesis: Jan’s epistemology places
a barrier between formal and everyday reasoning
From these two episodes we make our preliminary
interpretation. Jan’s learning behavior seems to be strongly
affected by her epistemology. In particular, Jan’s
epistemology divides the reasoning that can be used to
understand physical phenomena into two disparate
categories: formal, technical reasoning and everyday,
intuitive reasoning. Between these two types of reasoning is
a barrier (a “wall,” metaphorically) that keeps Jan from
looking for connections between ideas from the different
sides.
Jan is quite adept at some types of formal reasoning.
An open question for us at this point is how adept is she at
informal reasoning. However, we claim that even if Jan were
to use informal reasoning or accept that of her peers, her
tendency not to link the formal and informal would
continue to cause her difficulties.
In the following, we evaluate and expand our
hypothesis in two ways: by analyzing additional interview
data, and by exploring several counter-hypotheses (alternate
interpretations that don’t involve this epistemological
mechanism).
IVB. Results from the interviews:  Jan uses everyday
reasoning more often but still shows evidence of the
epistemological barrier between formal and everyday
reasoning.
Given Jan’s behavior in the tutorials, what stands out
most in the interviews is her willingness to approach
problems using the kind of everyday knowledge and
intuitive reasoning that we see her rejecting in tutorial.
Often she immediately responds to a question using
everyday/intuitive reasoning. Other times, if a formal line of
reasoning doesn’t work for her, she switches to
everyday/intuitive reasoning. In the following example,
from the third interview (3:243, interview 3, line 243), Jan
is asked whether it matters if you choose a long wrench or a
short wrench when loosening a stuck bolt.
Jan: Well I think it matters, I definitely think i t
matters. Because one of the things that we did in
physics was torque, and al-, you know when you have
to draw like a lever arm? And um, I think it was T = l r,
is that what it was? I don’t know.
Interviewer: What’s l and what’s r?
Jan: Like, like, okay this is like the pivot point, you
know like here, and so you would draw like a line, and
this is like the place from which you are going to
change it, you know, or like, you know…
Interviewer: This is like where you’re holding…
Jan: And you draw like some line here. I can’t
remember exactly. I should’ve learned physics better.
I should keep these things in my mind. So I think like
the further you go out, you know, the easier, that’s not
to say you go all the way out, but as things, it’s better
if you have it here than if you have it here. I think
what I can think about is like a door. You’ve got like
the hinge here and you know you’ve got like the
swinging door. I think if you push here [closer to the
hinge] is the door is going to feel more heavy that if
you push it out here [farther from the hinge].
Jan starts out here using formal reasoning, trying to
apply the concept of torque and the (incorrect) formula T =
Ir. However, she doesn’t seem to understand the formula or
remember how to use it. So then, after implying that she
doesn’t trust her formal physics reasoning in this case, she
switches gears and tries her common sense instead.
Specifically, she comes up with an everyday experience
(pushing a swinging door) that helps her solve the problem.
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In contrast to her behavior in the tutorial, we find that Jan is
far more likely to use everyday/intuitive reasoning to solve
physics problems in interviews. This does not mean that
Jan’s preference for formal versus everyday/intuitive
reasoning stems entirely from non-epistemological origins.
Rather her epistemology might depend on context, a context
dependence we can account for in a “resource-based” (as
opposed to “belief-based”) cognitive framework.23 In the
interviews, Jan may (consciously or unconsciously) activate
an epistemological resource that guides her to use
everyday/intuitive reasoning, a resource that stays “off” in
the classroom context.
This context-sensitivity of Jan’s epistemology is the
subject of a separate paper.24  We believe that this context-
sensitivity is good evidence against the notion of
epistemology as constructed of consistent, unitary, and
context-insensitive beliefs, but we will not argue that point
in this paper. Our goal here is to make a detailed
plausibility argument for the impact of epistemology on
learning.  That argument relies on the detailed refutation of
counterarguments.  Thus we need to deeply analyze an
aspect of Jan’s epistemology that is fairly consistent across
the two contexts from which our data is based. Although we
do not take a “belief” approach, we will spend most of the
remaining discussion describing an aspect of Jan’s
epistemology that is somewhat “belief-like” in these two
contexts.
Our data show that Jan’s view of the “separateness” of
formal and everyday/intuitive reasoning is consistent across
contexts. To get at this issue in the interviews, we look at
the frequency with which Jan checks and reconciles multiple
lines of reasoning. In the wrench example, for instance, Jan
had an opportunity to reconcile her idea that torque is
relevant with her idea that the wrench problem resembles
pushing a door. As teachers, we want Jan to ask herself,
“Does torque and the equation I thought of have anything to
do with the door example I’ve given?” But Jan does not do
that. We claim that her failure to do so stems in part from
the barrier she places between formal and everyday/intuitive
reasoning; if those two kinds of reasoning aren’t connected,
it makes no sense to try to reconcile them.
In contrast, Jan often reconciles two lines of reasoning
when they’re both formal or when they’re both
everyday/intuitive, For example, consider this exchange
about a bowling ball swinging on a chain (1:33).
Interviewer: Imagine that hanging from the ceiling by
a chain is a bowling ball, and somebody gets i t
swinging back and forth, like a pendulum. And
you’ve got like a stick or a mallet and you’re allowed
to whack as hard as you want, five times. And the
purpose of you whacking it is to get it swinging as
high as possible, so my question is, how--what would
your strategy be for the whacking? How, and where in
its swing would you want to whack it?
Jan: I think I’d probably want to whack it when it’s
kind of like on its way up, and whack it like from the
side going up, do you know what I mean?
Interviewer: Can you draw me a little--?
Jan: Yeah, like the chain is this way, and so it’s on its
way up, right? [Drawing a picture of a pendulum with
the bowling ball at the lowest point.] So I’d probably
whack it with the mallet right here.
Interviewer: I see, and what’s the, what sort of
triggered you to think that?
Jan: Well, it’s already on its way up, so there’s already
force there, right? And if you just add force in the
same direction, then it’s probably just going to add
up
Interviewer: So it’s like your adding onto something
which is already there, as opposed to--?
Jan: Trying to like oppose it, or to do something else.
Interviewer: Right, so by that reasoning the very
worst thing that you could do is like hit it the
opposite way, going to, trying to beat it into going
the other way.
Jan: Right, right. I mean, this would probably like
take a lot of energy out of you, but I think it would be
good. [Laughing]
Interviewer: Right, so each time you hit it, it would
start going a little bit higher, and to that effect. Cool,
OK, as long as we’re on this big bowling ball
pendulum, so let’s say that you are done whacking it,
now it’s swinging higher, and--
Jan: It’s also like when you, have a person on a swing,
well actually but when the person is on the swing you
actually hit them when they’re up here, but you push
them that way, so… [Drawing a picture of a swing at
it’s highest point.]
Interviewer: Huh, what do you make of that?
[Laughing.]
Jan: I don’t know [Laughing.] well, I mean it’s a little
different when a person is on a swing because it’s hard
to get underneath them when they’re like in this
position.
Jan starts by reasoning that you should whack the ball
when it’s going fastest (at the lowest point in the swing)
because you want to add “force” to “force.” We code this as
intuitive rather than formal reasoning; although she says the
word “force,” she seems to be using it in an informal,
colloquial way, as a term that expresses the “energy” or
“motion” of an object. We think she is reasoning,
intuitively, that you want to add whatever you’re going to
add whenever there’s the most of the target “stuff” already
there.
Jan’s second line of reasoning comes from her
everyday experience. She thinks of pushing a person on a
swing as an everyday instantiation of the problem at hand.
But then she notices a conflict. When you push a person on
a swing, you push at the high point of the swing, not the
low point she has decided would be best for the bowling
ball. Notice that rather than ignore the conflict by
abandoning one or the other line of reasoning, Jan
reconciles. She notes that, although we push people at the
high point, this may not indicate the most efficient
approach; we can’t push the swing at its low point “because
it’s hard to get underneath them when they’re like in this
position.”
Jan’s successful reconciliation in the bowling ball
example but lack of reconciliation in the wrench example is
consistent with our epistemological hypothesis. She can and
will reconcile when she doesn’t have to overcome the barrier
between formal and everyday/intuitive knowledge. This
pattern emerged robustly in the coding results.
Thirty-six problems from the first five interviews were
coded. (Interview 6 had a different format.) Each line of
reasoning in each problem was coded as involving
everyday/intuitive reasoning or formal reasoning. In the
bowling ball example, for instance, we coded two lines of
everyday/intuitive reasoning: the “adding ‘force’ to ‘force’
argument” and the “analogy to person on a swing.”
Altogether we coded 106 lines of reasoning. Jan used
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everyday/intuitive reasoning three times as often as formal
reasoning, 71 versus 22. (We discuss the remaining 13
instances in the following.)
We then coded when Jan did or didn’t reconcile given
an opportunity (generally a conflict or lack of connection
between two lines of reasoning.) Reconciliation
opportunities involving two formal lines of reasoning or
two everyday/intuitive lines of reasoning were coded as
“within-type.” For instance, in the swinging bowling ball
example, Jan reconciles within-type between “adding ‘force’
to ‘force’” and “analogy to person on a swing.”
Reconciliation opportunities involving formal versus
everyday/intuitive lines of reasoning were coded as
“between-type,” as illustrated in the wrench example with
the “torque equation” versus the “analogy to pushing a
door.” Of the 36 coded reconciliation opportunities, Jan
reconciles about 40% of the time (14 reconciles.) To test our
hypothesis about Jan’s epistemology, however, we must
look for differences between her tendency to reconcile within
type versus between types.
Within type (28 coded opportunities), Jan reconciled
about half the time (13 reconciles.)25 Most are unprompted,
and the others involve only mild prompting, as in the
bowling ball problem when the interviewer says, “What do
you make of that?” By contrast, between types (8 codings),
Jan reconciled only once.26 Although the number of codings
involved does not give very reliable statistics, the dramatic
difference between her within-type and between-type
reconciliation rates, 46% versus 13%, supports our
attribution of a barrier between formal and
everyday/intuitive thinking in Jan’s epistemology.  A
summary of our findings is included in Figure 1.
At times Jan’s reasoning seems to be neither
everyday/intuitive nor formal but rather a hybrid of the two.
Thirteen of our 106 lines of reasoning were coded as hybrid.
Hybrid reasoning is not a simple mix of the two other
types. Rather, it is a type of reasoning in which the
everyday/intuitive and formal are already integrated. (By
contrast, between-type reconciliation is an action to address
conflicts between everyday/intuitive and formal ideas that
are not already integrated.) For the hybrid reasoning to
occur, the ideas must have been integrated somehow at
some point in the past, probably involving multiple
between-type reconciliations. This type is rare in beginning
physics students but is common in practicing scientists.
The existence of a “hybrid” reasoning type seems to
contradict our hypothesis that Jan views formal and
everyday/intuitive reasoning as unconnected. However, our
hypothesis claims not that it is impossible for these types
of reasoning to be integrated for Jan, but rather that her
epistemology generally prevents her from searching for these
connections on her own. We found that most of Jan’s
integrated formal and intuitive reasoning can be explained in
a way that is consistent with our epistemological
interpretation. The instances of hybrid reasoning we found
were either instances where the connection between the
intuitive and formal were exceedingly transparent (almost
unavoidable) or instances where the connections between the
intuitive and formal had been stressed strongly and
repeatedly in the course. We believe that this effort by the
course instructor on particular topics helped Jan scale the
epistemological wall that normally would have prevented
these connections.
Our argument is that, due to Jan’s epistemology, she
does not search on her own for the connections between the
two types of reasoning. As mentioned, in the interview
coding, we found only one between-type reconciliation out
of eight opportunities. This finding becomes more
compelling and interesting if we look in detail at this one
instance. Jan is asked to explain the motion of a pencil that
has been thrown into the air (3:274). She starts with a line
of reasoning that we coded as hybrid, integrating her
everyday/intuitive ideas about a pencil’s motion with formal
concepts of velocity. Jan then discusses the influences of
gravity and air resistance and the “force from your hand” in
a hybrid fashion, but then gets confused about what happens
to the force of the hand: Does it permanently die out at the
peak or is it still influencing the motion when the pencil
comes back down? At this point the interviewer pushes her
very strongly not to let that go, but to try to figure out what
happens to the force of the hand. Jan brings in her last,
formal line of reasoning, discussing kinetic and potential
energy, and uses it to explain how the “force that you added
would be energy that you gave it, which is being
interconverted in the system [between kinetic and
potential],” and hence, the force (kinetic energy) from the
hand is still there as the ball falls even though it died away
temporarily at the peak (3:307). She is reconciling two lines
of reasoning. However, this “between-type” reconciliation is
weak in the sense that it was strongly prompted and
involved a hybrid and a formal line of reasoning rather than
fully scaling the barrier between formal and
Results:  13/28 opportunities reconciled (46%)
Between-type Reconciliation Opportunities
Results:  1/8 opportunities reconciled (13%)
Idea 1.
Everyday/Intuitive
Reasoning
 Idea 1. Formal
Reasoning
Idea 2.
Everyday/
Intuitive
Idea 2.
Formal
Within-type Reconciliation Opportunities
1. Everyday/
Intuitive
 1. Formal
2. Everyday/
Intuitive
2. Formal
Figure 1.   Reconciliation opportunities occur when the
relationship between two ideas Jan is using is ripe for
examining.   For instance, in the pendulum problem described
above, the line of reasoning about adding force where the
movement was greatest conflicted with the observation that
you push a person on a swing at the turning points.   If we call
the adding force idea “Idea 1” and the swing idea “Idea 2,” we
see that in the diagram this is a reconciliation opportunity
represented by the topmost arrow, since Idea 1 and Idea 2 both
use everyday/intuitive reasoning.   Since Jan does reconcile
these two ideas, we count this in the results as a “within-type”
reconcile.  The differences in the relative rates of reconciliation
in the within-type and between-type categories support our
hypothesis of the wall Jan’s epistemology places between the
two reasoning types.
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everyday/intuitive. Given that Jan’s lone instance of a
between-type reconciliation is weak, her tendency to
reconcile only within type becomes a more robust coding
result.
To test the reliability of our coding, we trained an
education researcher not previously involved with the
project and then had the coder apply our four coding steps
to a subset of our data, some randomly chosen problems,
and others deliberately culled from cases we ourselves
considered particularly difficult. The external coder saw the
same general trends as we did in the preponderance of
everyday/intuitive over formal or hybrid reasoning and in
the greater relative rate of within-type versus between-type
reconciliation. To further validate this result, we then
described the specific reconciliation opportunities from our
original codings. For each case, the coder decided whether
Jan reconciled, compromised, “checked,” or didn’t reconcile
at all. The external coder’s codings matched our codings
80% of the time.27
In summary, in comparison to the classroom data, the
interviews yielded opposite results regarding Jan’s
inclination to use everyday/intuitive versus formal
reasoning. The interviews also provide evidence that these
two types of reasoning can be integrated by Jan under
certain circumstances. However, both sets of data are robust
in showing Jan’s tendency not to look for connections
between these two types of reasoning. What the interviews
cannot establish completely is that this wall Jan places
between everyday/intuitive and formal reasoning accounts
for some of Jan’s learning difficulties in the tutorials. To
further that argument, we must refute alternative
explanations.
IVC. Refutation of alternative explanations:  Jan’s
difficulties cannot be accounted for without
epistemology.
We now discuss other possible contributors to Jan’s
behavior in the tutorials. Although some of these factors
play a role in Jan’s actions, no combination of these effects,
without epistemology, can account for all that we observe.
i.  Jan’s difficulties are not due to lack of facility or
confidence with mathematics.
We might consider attributing Jan’s repeated troubles
using E = F/q correctly in the electric field tutorial to a lack
of facility or confidence with mathematics. However,
evidence from that episode and from the interviews suggests
otherwise. We have already noted that Jan reasons in a
sophisticated manner with the equation E = F/q, using the
functional dependencies between variables – in this case
proportionalities and inverse proportionalities – to draw
information from the equation.
Perhaps even more striking, Jan shows the ability to
use mathematics intuitively. She refers to herself as “a
proportions person” (2:194) and can formulate her own
equations to express her intuitive reasoning (for example
1:128, 5:70), although she still differentiates these
equations ontologically from the classroom equations.
Furthermore, she explicitly states her confidence in her use
and learning of mathematics (for example 6:144).
ii. Jan’s difficulties are not due to lack of skill with
everyday reasoning in physics.
One could argue that Jan simply lacks skill with
informal reasoning in physics, perhaps for lack of practice.
This might explain, for example, why she would fail to
catch her math errors were she actually checking her math
against her informal reasoning. However, weak informal
reasoning cannot explain why she rejects as “not physics-
oriented” the common-sense reasoning of the rest of the
group. Furthermore, it is clearly not the case that Jan lacks
this skill. In interviews, Jan proficiently uses common-
sense, informal reasoning to work out physics problems.
iii.  Jan’s difficulties are not due to lack of skill at
checking.
Perhaps Jan fails to check her interpretations of E =
F/q, and fails to check how well she actually understands
Veronica’s model of light, because she has a general
tendency not to check her reasoning, or because she’s not
good at checking. Again, the interviews suggest otherwise.
In the 28 within-type reconciliation opportunities, there
were also 6 instances we coded either as "checking only,"
when Jan makes sure one line of reasoning agrees with the
answer  yielded by another line of reasoning (without
reconciling or even comparing the two lines of reasoning),
or as "compromise," when Jan glosses over rather than
directly addresses a contradiction she notices between two
lines of reasoning.  Our point is that, in 19 of 28 instances
(68%), Jan notices and in some way addresses a connection
between two lines of reasoning within type, proving that
she often notices the potential tension between different
lines of reasoning and that she has the skills to address the
tension.
Jan’s tendency to check and reconcile isn’t confined to
the interviews. For instance, later in the electric field
tutorial (after the portions presented previously), the group
considered a scenario in which a positive test charge is
pushed directly toward a positive source charge. Does that
“push force” do positive, negative, or zero work? Veronica
reasoned that because “the potential energy becomes greater,
the change in work is going to be negative,” because the
“The work … in, like, an electric field, it’s the opposite, the
opposite of the change in potential energy.” Jan
immediately wants to check this conclusion using an
analogy the professor pointed out between electrostatic
forces and gravity. She correctly notes that moving the
point charge is analogous to changing the height of a mass,
showing that the potential energy changes. In this instance
in which she has two formal lines of reasoning (for
example, reasoning about electric field and potential versus
a professor-supplied analogy to gravitation), Jan wants to
reconcile (although the group goes in a different direction
before Jan can make progress).
iv.  Jan’s actions cannot be fully explained by an
expectation that only formal reasoning will be rewarded
in the class.
As previous studies show,19,20 a student’s expectations
about what will be rewarded in a physics class need not
align with her epistemological views about what constitutes
learning and understanding. In tutorial, perhaps Jan focuses
on formal reasoning to the exclusion of everyday/intuitive
reasoning because she thinks formal reasoning is what the
course requires. This counterargument also would explain
why Jan is much more willing to use everyday/intuitive
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reasoning in the interviews, which were not part of the
physics course. However, formal expectations cannot
explain why Jan rejects everyday/intuitive reasoning that
could help her use E = F/q correctly. Even if exams reward
formal reasoning only, they don’t reward incorrect formal
reasoning. And after being corrected, Jan acknowledges that
she is using E = F/q incorrectly. Her classmates suggest
some common-sense reasoning that could help Jan apply E
= F/q correctly, but Jan acts as if that reasoning is
irrelevant.
Similarly, in the light and shadow tutorial, “formal”
expectations could explain why Jan rejects her group’s
everyday/intuitive model of light. But once again,
expectations alone can’t explain why Jan doesn’t engage in
learning just enough of Veronica-style everyday/intuitive
reasoning to apply formal resources correctly. Formal
expectations alone, unsupplemented by our epistemological
interpretation, cannot explain Jan’s behavior in tutorial.
v.  Jan’s confidence in her informal reasoning does
have an impact, but it can only account for her
behavior in concert with her epistemology.
Another counterargument is that Jan has low confidence
in her ability to use everyday/intuitive reasoning in physics,
and she therefore hides behind formal reasoning during
group work. This lack of confidence could explain not only
her nervous, perhaps self-deprecating laughter when she
explains her quest for a more “physics-oriented”
explanation, but also her willingness to use common-sense
reasoning in the interviews, where she perhaps feels safer
away from her peers and away from grade pressure.
We can quickly rule out one version of this
counterargument, the idea that Jan hides behind formal
reasoning during group work not because she lacks faith in
her ability to use everyday/intuitive reasoning, but because
she’s afraid of “stepping out on a limb” by expressing her
ideas publicly. According to this argument, Jan feels safer
sticking to more objective, formal reasoning. This version
of the counterargument fails, however, because it cannot
explain why Jan rejects other students’ everyday/intuitive
reasoning in the light and shadow tutorial, or why she has
such trouble using other students’ qualitative ideas to help
her interpret E = F/q correctly.
Another version of the confidence counterargument has
more traction: Jan avoids engaging in everyday/intuitive
reasoning during group work largely because she lacks faith
in her ability to learn and understand physics in those
terms. This could help to explain her resistance to using
everyday/intuitive reasoning when interpreting E = F/q as
well as her quest for a more “physics oriented” model of
light. It would also explain why Jan seems so much bolder
and more confident with her group when pursuing formal
explanations such as an analogy between gravitational and
electric potential. The interviews further buttress this
counterargument. Perhaps because the interviewer repeatedly
emphasized that he studies “student reasoning” and doesn’t
care whether her answers are correct, Jan willingly uses
everyday/informal reasoning. Even then she often hedges her
reasoning with qualifiers such as “maybe” and “it could be,”
and on several occasions she says her everyday way of
thinking doesn’t work reliably in physics. (We’ll give an
example in the following.)
It turns out that Jan’s lack of confidence with
everyday/intuitive reasoning in physics does indeed have a
large impact on her behavior, as we have discussed. But it
is Jan’s epistemological stance that a barrier separates formal
from everyday/intuitive reasoning that determines how she
deals with her lack of confidence. She feels that her
perceptions are imperfect and not to be relied upon.
“It always seems like, you know, there’s like a trick that
I’ve missed, you know, something that I’ve overlooked
or something that I haven’t thought about.” (5:138)
She gives static friction as an example, explaining that
although you have ample experience with pulling things,
you might fail to observe the need to pull harder at first
(5:178). There are several ways a student might deal with
the unreliability of perception-based everyday/intuitive
reasoning. One response would be to use the formal and
everyday/intuitive in conjunction, incorporating the two to
make a more robust understanding, thereby avoiding the
pitfalls of relying solely on imperfect intuitions and
perceptions. But Jan does not take this stance. Instead, she
generally keeps (unreliable) everyday/intuitive reasoning
separate from (reliable) formal reasoning. Our point is that
Jan’s response to the unreliability of everyday/intuitive
reasoning is driven in part by epistemology. Instead of
seeing problematic everyday/intuitive reasoning as refinable
and hence reconcilable with formal reasoning, she sees the
two kinds of reasoning as too separate to inform each other.
At one point, Jan laments that physics is unlike
chemistry, because chemistry is
“kind of totally new, you know, like you kind of have
a fresh brain,… I mean, you’re talking about
molecules and things you can’t really see, you know
so you have to kind of start fresh and I think so, so i t
makes it a little easier to think.” (5:186).
Jan would rather start with a blank slate (“fresh brain”) than
try to refine and build on her own ideas. Jan’s epistemology
and confidence are entangled and mutually reinforce one
another. Epistemology tells her the two domains are
separable. Her confidence says to reject one, and then she
only experiences success in the one domain, which leads to
reduced confidence in the other domain, and so on.
Although it is clear that confidence is playing a role, as an
alternative explanation it cannot stand alone, because it
relies on epistemology to have the effects we observe.
IVD. Summary: The epistemological mechanism is
plausible
We believe that we have made a strong case that Jan’s
learning difficulties in the two tutorial episodes stem in part
from her epistemology, in particular from the barrier Jan
places between formal and informal reasoning. This barrier
prevents her from searching for connections between these
two types of knowledge. By examining supplementary data
and evaluating alternative explanations,28 we have
established a highly plausible argument for this part of our
hypothesis, that Jan’s epistemology has a direct, causal
effect on her learning.
In testing our hypothesis, we have also discovered
more detail and subtlety to Jan’s epistemology and its
impact on her learning. We found that Jan’s epistemology
does not prevent her from using everyday/intuitive
reasoning in some contexts (for example, interviews) and
that there is a deep entanglement between Jan’s
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epistemology and her distrust of her intuition and
perceptions. Another intriguing issue is the existence in
Jan’s reasoning of a hybrid form in which formal and
everyday/intuitive reasoning are integrated, generally when
explicitly taught and sanctioned by the professor. Clearly
this integration is not impossible for Jan. Yet her
epistemology leads her only rarely to strive for this
integration on her own, and even to resist it in many
situations.
One hallmark of an epistemological effect is when we
see students failing to use skills or knowledge they clearly
possess. Jan’s skills, her abilities, her store of ideas -- none
of these are the “limiting reagent” for her learning in these
episodes. She is capable and fluid with mathematical,
technical, and everyday, common-sense reasoning. She is
capable of checking her understanding and reconciling
inconsistencies. She is capable of working through difficult
problems for which she has very little relevant formal
knowledge. Despite all these strengths, her epistemology
sometimes gets in the way of her learning.
IVE. Implications
Our case study has built on previous research into
epistemology and learning to show, in causal detail, how
epistemology can have a profound effect on the learning-
relevant behavior of students.  This is important for several
reasons. First, this type of analysis provides supporting
evidence that the effects of epistemology on learning
outcomes observed in correlational studies are in fact causal.
Learning also most likely plays a causal role in the
development of a personal epistemology; but making a
strong case for local causality in one direction is an
important first step in understanding the complex interplay
between the two.
For the curriculum developer and the classroom
teacher, understanding how epistemology affects learning —
or just keeping in mind that epistemology affects learning
— has broad implications. In designing curriculum,
developers must attend to epistemological as well as
conceptual, social, or affective factors. For instance,
epistemology can help us understand why a piece of
curriculum optimized to address conceptual difficulties is
ineffective for some students. Curriculum developers can
take up the challenge of helping students associate their
productive epistemological resources with the activity, the
course, and the discipline.
There are also some implications that link specifically
to the epistemological resource of a barrier between formal
and everyday reasoning.  Numerous physics teachers and
researchers have noticed that students rarely hook up their
conceptual/intuitive knowledge to their formal knowledge
and problem-solving techniques. An epistemological barrier
helps explain why this disconnect exists for many students,
and what can be done about it.
For instance, Kanim found that even when students
gain a deeper, more intuitive conceptual understanding of a
topic (such as batteries and bulbs), they don’t apply that
knowledge to traditional quantitative problems (for
example, about circuits).29 To address this gap, Kanim
started creating topic-by-topic bridging worksheets designed
to help students connect their conceptual knowledge to their
formal reasoning. Although many of these worksheets work
well, Kanim noted the extreme, iterative effort needed to
develop them; the bridging worksheets seem to keep
exposing new student difficulties. For instance, even when
students could answer an intuitive qualitative question
about resultant vectors, they had trouble applying that
knowledge to formal vector addition.
In our view, an epistemological barrier between
everyday/intuitive and formal knowledge can help us
understand why students have such trouble bridging those
two types of knowledge, even when strongly supported.30 If
we are right, then Kanim’s bridging worksheets might
become even more effective by explicitly addressing this
epistemological issue. The worksheets could include
activities and reflection questions designed to help students
realize that their thought processes sometimes incorporate
such a barrier and that some of their “ah hah” moments of
understanding occur when they scale or tear down the
barrier. When students’ epistemologies become more
aligned with the goals of the bridging worksheets, students
might become better at spotting and addressing new
difficulties they encounter. For instance, consider a student
who has learned to expect that her intuitive mathematical
knowledge — for instance, her common-sense ideas about a
hiker who walks two miles north and then three miles east
— should mesh with formal mathematical tools. Especially
when supported, that student would probably use her hiker
knowledge when figuring out or making sense of formal
vector addition rules. Consequently, she could resolve her
vector difficulties more quickly than would otherwise be the
case.
We lack space to discuss the details of
epistemologically-focused curricula and teaching practices
our research group has used.31 Key components include
listening for students’ epistemological strengths and
difficulties during office hours and recitation section; using
tutorials and interactive lecture demonstrations designed to
tap into productive epistemological resources (for sense-
making and consistency) and highlight learning strategies;
and using some reflective tutorial questions, homework
questions, and class discussions to focus students’ attention
on their approach to learning.
V. CONCLUSION
Our biggest challenge as instructors is listening to our
students, responding to their difficulties, and facilitating
their use of productive cognitive resources they possess. In
diagnosing student learning, we must consider their
strengths and difficulties of an epistemological nature.
Specifically, we must learn to identify the epistemological
resources that students possess and to understand which
resources they are using during the learning process, so that
we can help them to choose the more productive approaches
to learning. Our strong argument about the plausibility of a
causal mechanism by which epistemology can affect
learning gives more reason than ever to believe that
epistemological interventions could lead to better conceptual
learning.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank Joe Redish, David Hammer, and
the members of the Physics Education Research Group at
the University of Maryland for playing a large part in this
11                     Submitted to the American Journal of Physics
investigation, with special thanks to David May and
Rebecca Lippmann.  This work was done in part with the
support of NSF grant REC-0087519.  We would also like
to thank advisory board members John Fredriksen and Paul
Feltovich for useful suggestions early in the analysis.
Thanks are also due to several anonymous reviewers and
many members of the American Association of Physics
Teachers whose questions helped us refine our focus.
*Current address: Science Education Group, Department of Physics,
Astronomy, and Geosciences, Towson University, Towson, MD 21252
1L. C. McDermott and E. F. Redish, “Resource letter PER-1: Physics
education research,” Am. J. Phys. 67, 755-767 (1999).
2D. Hammer, “Epistemological beliefs in introductory physics,” Cog.
Instruct. 12 (2), 151-183 (1994).
3E. F. Redish, J. M. Saul, and R. N. Steinberg, “Student expectations in
introductory physics,” Am. J. Phys. 66, 212-224 (1998).
4W.-M. Roth and A. Roychoudhury, “Physics students’ epistemologies and
views about knowing and learning,” J. Res. Sci. Teach. 31 (1), 5-30
(1994).
5For clarity, we draw this distinction between metacognition and
epistemology. Metacognition refers to awareness and manipulations of
one’s knowledge, such as monitoring one’s understanding while reading
a textbook and checking an answer for plausibility. Epistemology, in
contrast, refers to ideas about the nature of knowledge and learning –
viewing textbook physics knowledge as something that can be
understood or “checking” as a way to reconcile qualitative and
quantitative knowledge. A student’s epistemology can help to drive
which metacognitive strategies she does and does not use.
6For a review, see B. K. Hofer and P. R. Pintrich, “The development of
epistemological theories: Beliefs about knowledge and knowing and
their relation to learning,” Rev. Ed. Res. 67 (1), 88-140 (1997).
7M. Schommer, “Epistemological development and academic
performance among secondary students,” J. Ed. Psych. 85 (3), 406-11
(1993).
8M. Schommer, A. Crouse, and N. Rhodes, “Epistemological beliefs and
mathematical text comprehension: Believing it is simple does not make it
so,” J. Ed. Psych. 84 (4), 435-443 (1992).
9N. B. Songer and M. C. Linn, “How do students’ views of science
influence knowledge integration?,” J. Res. Sci. Teach. 28 (9), 761-84
(1991).
1 0G. Qian and D. E. Alvermann, “The role of epistemological beliefs and
learned helplessness in secondary school students’ learning science
from text, “ J. Ed. Psych. 82, 282-292 (1995).
1 1D. B. May and E. Etkina, “College physics students’ epistemological
self-reflection and its relationship to conceptual learning,” Am. J. Phys.
70 (12), 1249-1258 (2002).
1 2K. Hogan, “Relating students’ personal frameworks for science
learning to their cognition in collaborative contexts,” Sci. Ed. 83, 1-32
(1999).
1 3J. Ryder and J. Leach, “University science students’ experiences of
investigative project work and their images of science,” Int. J. Sci. Ed.
21 (9), 945-956 (1999).
1 4R. Millar, F. Lubben, R. Gott, and S. Duggan, “Investigating in the
school science laboratory: Conceptual and procedural knowledge and
their influence on performance,” Res. Pap. Ed. 9 (2), 207-248 (1994).
1 5M. Taylor-Robertson, “Use of videotape-stimulated recall interviews to
study the thoughts and feelings of students in an introductory biology
laboratory course,” unpublished master’s thesis, Cornell University,
Ithaca, NY, 1984.
1 6K. M. Edmondson, “The influence of students’ conceptions of scientific
knowledge and their orientations to learning on their choices of learning
strategy in a college introductory level biology course,” unpublished
doctoral dissertation, 1 7Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1989.
1 8C. S. Dweck, Self-Theories: Their Role in Personality, Motivation and
Development (Psychology Press, Philadelphia, PA, 1999).
1 9D. Hammer, “Two approaches to learning physics,” Phys. Teach. 27,
664-671 (1989).
2 0A. Elby, “Another reason physics students learn by rote,” Am. J. Phys.
67 (7), S52-S57 (1999).
2 1D. R. Sokoloff and R. K. Thornton, ‘Using interactive lecture
demonstrations to create an active learning environment,” Phys. Teach.
35, 340-347 (1997).
2 2The tutorials used were a mixture of University of Washington tutorials
[L. C. McDermott, P. S. Schaffer, and the Physics Education Group,
Tutorials in Introductory Physics (Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ,
2002)] and tutorials written by the University of Maryland Physics
Education Research Group. Tutorials lead students through a structured
series of questions and activities usually aimed at developing qualitative
conceptual understanding (rather than traditional problem solving) and
often focusing on common student difficulties such as the difference
between velocity and acceleration.
2 3We will refer to the archival version of the appendix here. The
appendix will contain transcripts and more detailed arguments.
2 4See D. Hammer, “Student resources for learning introductory physics,”
Am. J. Phys. 68 (7), S52-S59 (2000), and D. Hammer and A. Elby, “On
the form of a personal epistemology,” in Personal Epistemology: The
Psychology of Beliefs about Knowledge and Knowing, edited by B. K.
Hofer and P. R. Pintrich (Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, 2001), pp.
169-190.
2 5A paper about the context-sensitivity of Jan’s epistemology is currently
in preparation.
In addition to those 13 “strong” reconciles, Jan also displayed two
instances of checking-only and four instances of compromise. One
example of checking-only is when Jan made sure one line of reasoning
agreed with the answer yielded by another line of reasoning, without
reconciling or even comparing the two lines of reasoning. Compromises
involve comparing two lines of reasoning but glossing over rather than
addressing the contradictions. We mention these codings because they
involve at least some kind of contact between two kinds of reasoning, a
contact noticeably absent in Jan’s reasoning in the electric field tutorial
episode.
2 6She also displayed two instances of between-type checking-only, a
coding category explained in Ref. 25. Even if we’re generous about
what is counted as reconciliation and therefore include compromises
and checking-only instances in our final tallies, Jan’s within-type
reconciliation rate of 68% (19 of 28) is still much higher than her
between-type reconciliation rate of 33% (3 of 9), supporting our
hypothesis of a barrier in Jan’s epistemology between formal and
everyday/intuitive reasoning.
2 7This  paper  and i t ’s  appendices are avai lable at
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/physics/0411007.
2 8Readers may wonder if some of the behavior we see on the videotape is
due to the students’ nervousness at being taped. Although the students
agreed to tapings and the cameras are in plain view, we have evidence
that they seem to forget about them.  For example, a few minutes after
Jan’s “physics-oriented” comment, the group starts to discuss things
more personal than we believe they would discuss in front of an
instructor or researcher. (We did not watch or transcribe this portion of
the video.)
2 9S. Kanim, “Connecting concepts to problem-solving,” Proceedings of
the 2001 Physics Education Research Conference: Research at the
Interface (Rochester, NY, July 25-16, 2001), pp. 37-40.
3 0We don’t dispute Kanim’s claim that new conceptual difficulties keep
appearing. But we think that’s only part of the problem. In many cases,
the epistemological barrier between formal and everyday/intuitive
knowledge may make it especially difficult for students to spot and
resolve what would otherwise be fairly “easy” conceptual problems.
3 2D. Hammer and A. Elby, “Tapping epistemological resources for
learning physics.” J. Learn. Sci. 12 (1), 53-90 (2003); A. Elby, “Helping
physics students learn how to learn,” Am. J. Phys. 69 (7), S54-S64
(2001); E. F. Redish, “Developing student expectations in algebra-based
physics,” presentation at the Conference on Integrating Science and
Math Education Research, Orono, ME, June, 2002,
<http://www.physics.umd.edu/perg/talks/redish/
Maine02/EFRMaineExpects.pdf>
.
